Behind the legal truce between THE Ohio State University and THE Marc Jacobs
In late April, fashion brand Marc Jacobs and The Ohio State University called a truce in their battle over the trademark “THE.”
Marc Jacobs filed an intent-to-use application with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office for its “THE” mark in May 2019, for use on various clothing and handbag goods and accessories. In August, OSU filed an application for its “THE” mark, for use on various clothing goods and accessories, claiming dates of first use going back to August 2005. OSU ultimately filed an opposition against Marc Jacobs’ application with the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board in April 2021.
Alongside a summary of OSU’s history and use of “THE” as part of the school’s name and as a trademark, OSU’s filing noted that the parties had already executed a Consent to Registration Agreement (when each party consents to registration of the other party’s mark/application) and filed amendments to the identification of goods in the respective applications.
While this dispute may serve as a reminder of the critical distinction between priority of use and priority of application, perhaps another notable question pertains to the right of any person or entity to register a trademark for such a common word.
Before diving further into more substantive discussion, it’s helpful to review certain principles of trademark law in the United States, starting with this vital premise: Trademarks are not monopolies.
For example, a trademark registration granted for the word “THE” would not preclude everybody else from using the word “the” in any context or in connection with any and all goods/services. Trademarks are source-identifiers for goods/services, and trademark rights are tied to the goods/ services with which the mark is used. In determining whether an existing trademark registration might bar registration of a later application, the question is whether there is a “likelihood of confusion” — in other words, whether a consumer would be confused as to the source or sponsorship of the goods/services offered under the respective marks because of the marks used on the good or service.
As for priority of application vs. priority of use, in the case of Marc Jacobs and OSU, despite claiming use predating Marc Jacobs’ application filing date, the fact remained that OSU’s application was filed after the filing of Marc Jacobs’ application.
In
the United States, trademark rights typically go to the first user of a
mark. However, the intent-to-use filing basis effectively creates an
exception to this rule with the USPTO.
Indeed,
OSU’s application was initially suspended in April 2020, pending the
outcome of the Marc Jacobs application. The reason for this is that
trademark applications are examined based on their filing dates and not
on the claimed dates of first use. As such, waiting to file an
application carries the inherent risk that someone else may file an
application for the same or similar mark for overlapping goods/services
first, putting them ahead in line for examination.
Should
the earlier application be allowed/ published for opposition, any
junior filers unable to otherwise overcome a likelihood of confusion
refusal via argument would carry the burden of opposing the application
or cancelling the registration to clear the path.
Marc
Jacobs and OSU appear to have agreed that, due to the manner of use and
other circumstances related to each parties’ use of the respective
“THE” marks, no likelihood of confusion exists. Each party has also
filed an amendment to clarify its channel of trade and target customer
base.
In particular,
Marc Jacobs added language referring to “channels customary to the field
of contemporary fashion,” to each identification of goods in its
application, and OSU added language referring to “channels customary to
the field of sports and collegiate athletics,” to the identification of
goods in its application.
But,
despite reaching a consent agreement, OSU’s opposition was filed in the
event that the USPTO examining attorney took issue with the agreement.
While consent agreements are not uncommon and often highly effective in
overcoming a likelihood of confusion refusal, there remains a risk that a
USPTO examining attorney might deem an agreement a “naked consent
agreement.”
As such,
any consent agreement should set forth sufficiently detailed reasoning
and evidence in support of the parties’ position that there is no
likelihood of confusion and, where possible, language regarding future
efforts by each party to prevent/ address confusion.
Here, as each party’s application and the opposition proceeding remain pending, the official outcome remains to be seen.
Attorney
Catherine Yao, an associate in McLane Middleton’s Intellectual Property
Practice Group, can be reached at 603-628-1380 or catherine.yao@mclane.com.
If granted, it would not preclude everybody else from using the word
— the question is whether there is a ‘likelihood of confusion.’